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_____________ 
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_____________ 
 
 
DR. FADI CHAABAN; DR. SABINO R. TORRE;  
DR. CONSTANTINOS A. COSTEAS;  
DR. ANTHONY J. CASELLA,  
as Trustees of Diagnostics & Clinical Cardiology, P.A. Profit Sharing Plan 
 
v. 
 
DR. MARIO A. CRISCITO, 
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______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:08-cv-01567) 
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
______ 
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Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 7, 2012) 
 
______ 
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The current Trustees of the Diagnostics & Clinical Cardiology, P.A. Profit Sharing 
Plan (the “Plan”) filed suit alleging that Dr. Mario Criscito (“Criscito”), the trustee of the 
Plan until 2007, violated the fiduciary duties he owed to the Plan participants under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).  The District Court granted the 
Trustees’ motion for summary judgment, denied Criscito’s motion for summary 
judgment, and awarded the Trustees $4,117,464.65.  Criscito appeals the decision.  We 
will affirm the District Court.1
I. 
 
We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and 
procedural history of this case.  Accordingly, we will state only those facts essential to 
resolving this dispute.  Criscito formed the Plan for Diagnostics & Clinical Cardiology  
(“DCC”) in 1975, and served as its trustee from its inception until 2007.  This position 
imposed fiduciary duties on Criscito in his management of the Plan.  See Eric D. Chason, 
Redressing All ERISA Fiduciary Duties Under § 409(a), 83 TEMP. L. REV. 147, 150 
(2011) (“ERISA creates a fiduciary relationship with respect to any ‘employee benefit 
plan’ or simply ‘plan,’ which provides either ‘pension’ or ‘welfare’ benefits.”).  
The suit filed by the Trustees focuses on a sale of stock by Criscito in January of 
2000, when he was the Plan’s trustee.  At that time, the Plan consisted of two types of 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to the extent it is a 
final decision of the District Court.  See section II.C infra discussing failure to seek 
District Court review of Magistrate Judge’s order. 
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accounts.  The first was a commingled account where assets were held in a single account 
with each participant owning a portion of the account’s assets.  The second was an 
individual account, which participants owned in the entirety.  The two large commingled 
accounts that are the focus of this suit were the “Morgan Stanley Account” and the 
“Smith Barney Account.”  In January 2000 Criscito decided to do away with the 
commingled accounts in favor of creating individual accounts for each participant.   
Before the commingled accounts were split into individual accounts, Criscito sold 
the stock in the Morgan Stanley Account near the peak of the “tech bubble” in January of 
2000.  The assets in the Account were worth $12,952,936.42 at the end of 1999,2 but 
Criscito reported to the third-party administrator, American Pension Corporation 
(“APC”), that the balance of the account was $4,017,942.57.3
                                              
2 The 1998 year-end statement for the Morgan Stanley Account shows a value of 
$2,355,460.58.  App. at 72.  In 1999, however, the price of “Veritas Software” stock 
increased drastically, from $59 15/16 on December 31, 1998, to $143 1/8 on December 
31, 1999.  Throughout this period purchases were made, increasing the number of shares 
in the Account from 7,875 at the end of 1998 to 67,125 at the end of 1999.  Compare 
App. at 72 with App. at 74.  This stock was subsequently sold between January 5 and 12, 
2000, at prices ranging from a high of $140 3/8 to a low of $110 3/8.  App. at 80.  
Although other assets were in the Account, this stock accounted for a majority of the 
value in the Account. 
 (Compare Appendix 
(“App.”). at 74 (statement showing balance in Morgan Stanley Account of 
$12,952,936.42) with App. at 82 (Criscito fax to APC stating balance of Morgan Stanley 
Account was $4,017,942.57) and App. at 658–66 (APC’s 1999 year-end report reflecting 
3 Criscito owned roughly 88% of the two commingled accounts, so a large portion of the 
roughly $8.9 million that he understated belonged to himself.  Criscito also understated 
the value of the Smith Barney account by about $3.1 million.  Compare App. at 83 and 
App. at 1129 (1999 year-end value of $3,924,549.92) with App. at 82 (report to APC that 
1999 year-end value was $798,425.50). 
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this information)).  Criscito’s mendacious reports understated the value of each 
individual’s portion of the Morgan Stanley Account, and so the participants received 
smaller transfers into their individual accounts when the transition occurred. 
Criscito was able to do this because he exercised complete control over the Plan 
and its accounts.  He instructed both APC and Morgan Stanley employees that they were 
not permitted to speak to anyone other himself, and requested that all information be sent 
only to his home address.  App. at 676–82.  This even included a threat by Criscito that 
he would go to APC and “beat” an APC employee if any information regarding the Plan 
went to the DCC office or to Casella.4
Criscito succeeded in concealing his actions.  For example, Mark Brown, DCC’s 
administrator, requested information regarding his balance in the commingled account in 
1999.  Representatives from both APC and Morgan Stanley informed Brown that they 
  App. at 679.  When Criscito provided APC with 
the year-end numbers, he did so either verbally or by providing documents which he 
created.  App. at 533 & 674.  He did not provide copies of statements from the accounts.  
APC used the inaccurate information it was given by Criscito to prepare the Form 5500 
for the Plan, and Criscito signed these forms and submitted them to the IRS.  Criscito 
proceeded to use the balance of the Morgan Stanley Account for personal transactions.  
These transactions are detailed at length in the Trustee’s brief, pages 17–25, and included 
withdrawals that Criscito admits were for personal use, as well as transfers to other 
accounts in Criscito’s name, trusts, real estate investments, and resorts in South Florida. 
                                              
4 The employee did not believe he was being physically threatened; rather he was under 
the impression that if the information went to DCC or Casella, APC would be fired.  App. 
at 639–40. 
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could not release information to him; only Criscito could access the information Brown 
was seeking.  App. at 688–90.  When Brown sought the information from Criscito, he 
was told “Don’t ask Mario.  You’re fine.  Uncle Mario is taking care of you,” before 
being given a balance on a napkin.  App. at 689.  The degree of Criscito’s control is also 
shown by the fact that the new Trustees did not discover his fraudulent actions in dealing 
with the Morgan Stanley Account until he was removed as the Plan’s trustee in 2007.  
Criscito provided no documentation to the new Trustees and only after analyzing and 
piecing together the information APC had on file were the new Trustees able to discover 
Criscito’s fraudulent scheme.  During this review by the Trustees, it was also discovered 
that APC received a copy of a March 2000 statement from Morgan Stanley that disclosed 
the full value of the account.  APC possessed this statement but never opened it or 
discovered the discrepancy. 
Criscito states that he did not deprive the participants of their funds; rather, he kept 
them invested in the Smith Barney Account even while he was transferring monies from 
that Account.  (Appellant’s Br. at p.9.)  This directly conflicts, however, with the lawsuit 
he has filed in New Jersey state court asserting full ownership of the assets of the 
Account.  App. at 1385 ¶50; 1386 ¶55; 1390 ¶13. 
The District Court found no genuine issues of material fact regarding the Trustees’ 
suit, granted their motion for summary judgment, and awarded them damages.  It also 
denied Criscito’s motion for summary judgment.  Criscito timely appealed. 
II. 
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On appeal, Criscito argues that the District Court erred: (1) in denying his motion 
to dismiss as well as his motion for summary judgment on the grounds of the statute of 
limitations; (2) in granting summary judgment to the Trustees; (3)  in failing to allow him 
to implead APC as a third-party defendant; and (4) in its calculation of compensatory 
damages.  We reject Criscito’s arguments, and will affirm. 
A.  
We review the District Court’s denial of Criscito’s motion to dismiss and motion 
for summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as that Court.  Meditz v. City 
of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 369 (3d Cir. 2011).  A motion to dismiss is granted if the 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; failing to satisfy the 
statute of limitations is one such ground.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Robinson v. Johnson, 
313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002).  When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept all 
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Summary judgment is granted only “where the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).  We must “view the underlying facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the” Trustees, since they are the party 
opposing the motion.  Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995) 
ERISA has a statute of limitations for bringing actions against fiduciaries.  29 
U.S.C. § 1113.5
                                              
5 29 U.S.C. § 1113 reads: 
  “This section [] creates a general six year statute of limitations, 
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shortened to three years in cases where the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the breach, 
and potentially extended to six years from the date of discovery in cases involving fraud 
or concealment.”  Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).   
The “fraud or concealment” exception is the focus here.  This exception aims to 
“codify a portion of the common law for ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims.”  In re 
Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 242 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“Unisys III”)  “The issue raised by this provision is not simply whether the alleged 
breach involved some kind of fraud but rather whether the fiduciary took steps to hide its 
breach so that the statute should not begin to run until the breach is discovered.”  Id.  
Simply alleging a “complaint [that] ‘sounds in concealment’” is insufficient; a plaintiff 
must show “evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to hide its breach of 
fiduciary duty.”  Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1552 (3d Cir. 1996).   
The Trustees’ complaint alleges that Criscito misreported the value of the Plan’s 
assets in order to misappropriate these assets for his own use on or about January 13, 
2000.  The Trustees state that they did not discover these actions until July 2007, when 
                                                                                                                                                  
No action may be commenced under this subchapter with respect to a 
fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation under this part, 
or with respect to a violation of this part, after the earlier of— 
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of 
the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the latest date on 
which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or  
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual 
knowledge of the breach or violation;  
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action may be 
commenced not later than six years after the date of discovery of such 
breach or violation. 
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Criscito was removed from his position as trustee of the plan and they took over as 
trustees.   
Based upon the following undisputed material facts, we conclude that Criscito’s 
actions constitute “fraudulent concealment.”  When the Trustees removed Criscito as 
trustee of the Plan, he provided them with no documentation of his activities for the thirty 
years he was the trustee.  The new Trustees were forced to consult the files of APC and 
other sources in order to piece together the financial transactions taken by Criscito.  It 
was only at this point that it became clear that Criscito had submitted false information to 
APC regarding the division of the Morgan Stanley Account.6
While this fraud was occurring, Criscito insisted that APC send all information 
regarding the Plans only to his home address.  He instructed APC employees that they 
were not permitted to speak to anyone other than himself about the Plans, and multiple 
documents from the APC file confirm these instructions.  App. at 676–82.  Criscito 
succeeded in hiding his actions, as they went undiscovered until 2007. 
  This fraud is made plain by 
the fact that Criscito signed the Forms 5500 for the Plan, containing the false information 
he provided to APC, and submitted them to the IRS.   
The incident with Brown is illustrative of the effects of Criscito’s control of the 
information pertaining to the value of the Plan’s assets.  Had Brown been provided the 
true value of his portion of the Morgan Stanley Account when he asked for it in 1999, he 
would have known of Criscito’s deception when his individual account was set up and 
                                              
6 As mentioned earlier, Criscito either verbally submitted the numbers, or provided 
documents which he created.  He did not provide APC with the actual statements 
showing the balances in the various accounts. 
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contained a smaller balance than he had previously been told.  This incident is indicative 
of the affirmative acts Criscito took to hide the full value of the commingled accounts.  
He alone could access the information, and with this power he provided erroneous 
balances to the individuals with interests in the commingled accounts, like Brown.  This, 
in turn, allowed Criscito to understate the 1999 year-end balance7
Criscito’s broad response is that he did not actively conceal any information from 
the Trustees, nor did he take any fraudulent actions while he was trustee of the accounts.  
More narrowly, he states that APC possessed the true values of the brokerage accounts as 
of March 2000, which it received directly from Morgan Stanley,
 and distribute smaller 
balances to the plan participants than they were entitled to.  
8
Criscito’s attempt to shift the blame for his actions to APC and the Trustees is 
unavailing.  The record makes clear that Criscito (1) fraudulently misreported the account 
 and failed to cross-
check the figures on the brokerage accounts with the figures Criscito earlier provided to 
APC.  Because APC possessed the real values that showed discrepancies, Criscito 
contends he cannot be considered to have actively concealed his actions.  Further, 
Criscito argues that the Trustees did not exercise due diligence regarding their 
investments.  Instead they “willfully blind[ed] themselves to the truth and [now] claim to 
have been defrauded.”  
                                              
7 Since APC relied upon the asset values provided in the 1999 Form 5500 to calculate the 
value of the Forms 5500 from 2000 to 2005, this misrepresentation affected many 
documents.  
8 This disclosure was inadvertent, as Criscito informed Morgan Stanley that no 
information was to be sent directly to APC or anyone else.  Again, Criscito demanded 
that only he have access to the information.  App. at 690. 
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balance of the commingled account at the end of 1999, (2) transferred monies from the 
commingled account to the individual accounts that did not represent each individual’s 
full interest in the commingled account, and (3) exerted such control over the activities 
and information of the Plan that he was able to hide his fraudulent actions for years.  As a 
result, the “fraud or concealment” exception in § 1113 applies in this case and the 
Trustees complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations.  The decisions by the 
District Court to deny Criscito’s motion to dismiss, as well as his motion for summary 
judgment, were proper and will be affirmed. 
B.  
 We now turn to Criscito’s claim that the District Court erred in granting the  
Trustees’ motion for summary judgment.  Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) and 29 U.S.C. § 
1109(a), the Trustees may file a civil action for damages.  Section 1109(a) states that 
“[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall 
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each 
such breach.”  We have previously distilled these sections and stated the elements of such 
a claim are “(1) a plan fiduciary (2) breaches an ERISA-imposed duty (3) causing a loss 
to the plan.”  Leckey v. Stefano, 501 F.3d 212, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2007).9
                                              
9 The relevant ERISA duties are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (“a fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims . . . .”) and 
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 It is clear that Criscito was a plan fiduciary.  Despite protestations by Criscito, it is 
also clear the Trustees have demonstrated that the absence of a genuine dispute regarding 
whether Criscito breached his ERISA-imposed duty or caused a loss to the plan.  As 
discussed above, the facts demonstrate that Criscito violated the fiduciary duties he owed 
to the Plan’s beneficiaries by fraudulently reporting inaccurate account balances to APC 
and the beneficiaries, improperly distributing the Plan’s assets, and using the assets for 
his personal benefit.  These fraudulent actions resulted in a loss when the Plan 
participants received an amount smaller than their proportionate shares in the Morgan 
Stanley Account.  The Trustees satisfied their burden of demonstrating no genuine 
disputes as to the material facts regarding this claim, and on these facts they are entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  
C.  
Criscito argues that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant him 
leave to file a third-party complaint against APC.  The Trustees reply that because the 
decision was made by Magistrate Judge Arleo and Criscito did not ask the District Judge 
to review the decision, Magistrate Judge Arleo’s order is final.  Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (“As a general rule, we do 
not consider on appeal issues that were not raised before the district court in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances.”).  In his reply brief, Criscito concedes that “[t]he 
                                                                                                                                                  
§ 1106(b)(1) (“A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not . . . deal with the assets of the 
plan in his own interest or for his own account . . . .”). 
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[Trustees] are correct from a procedural standpoint.”  Accordingly, we will not address 
the issue. 
D.  
We now turn to Criscito’s claim regarding prejudgment interest.  We have held 
awarding prejudgment interest furthers the remedial purposes of ERISA.  Anthuis v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992).  We review the District 
Court’s computation of damages and the interest on those damages for abuse of 
discretion.  Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(applying to ERISA “the long-standing rule that, in the absence of an explicit statutory 
command otherwise, district courts have broad discretion to award prejudgment interest 
on a judgment obtained pursuant to a federal statute”); see also Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In a suit to enforce a right under ERISA, 
the question of whether or not to award prejudgment interest is ordinarily left to the 
discretion of the district court. . . .  Since prejudgment interest is an element of the 
plaintiff’s complete compensation, the same considerations that inform the court’s 
decision whether or not to award interest at all should inform the court’s choice of 
interest rate.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).   
ERISA fiduciaries who breach the duties imposed upon them are 
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting 
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such 
fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the 
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as 
the court may deem appropriate . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
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Here, the District Court calculated the principal removed from the plan by Criscito 
to be $1,681,572.65.  App. at 1433.  The Court added $2,418,292 in interest and $17,600 
in clerical costs.  Id.  The amount of interest was calculated using the Voluntary 
Fiduciary Correction Program Online Calculator (“VFCP calculator”) provided by the 
Department of Labor.  DEP’T OF LABOR, Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program 
Online Calculator with Instructions, Examples and Manual Calculations, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/calculator/.  The VFCP calculator is approved by the 
Department of Labor and uses rates calculated by the Internal Revenue Service to 
determine the “Lost Earnings” of ERISA plan beneficiaries.  Voluntary Fiduciary 
Correction Program Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 71 
Fed. Reg. 20262, 20272 (proposed Apr. 19, 2006).  The “Lost Earnings” amount “is 
intended to approximate the amount that would have been earned by the plan on the 
Principal Amount, but for the Breach.”  Id. at 20271, § 5(b)(5).   
Criscito attacks the damage award on several grounds.  First, he argues that the 
District Court erred in assuming that he “stole” roughly $1.68 million from the 
commingled accounts.  We have already stated above, in the context of the parties’ 
motions for summary judgment, that the Trustees have shown there is no genuine dispute 
regarding whether Criscito fraudulently took money that belonged to other investors in 
the Plan.  Given this finding, as well as our review of the evidence submitted by the 
parties, we agree with the District Court’s calculation of the amount of principal that 
Criscito did not transfer into the individual accounts of the Plan participants. 
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Criscito’s second line of attack focuses on the Smith Barney Account.  He asserts 
that the Smith Barney Account belongs to the Plan and that the value of it reflects 
amounts that still belong to the Plan participants.  But, Criscito has asserted in New 
Jersey state court that he is the rightful owner of the Smith Barney Account, which 
contradicts his argument in this case.  App. at 1385 ¶50; 1386 ¶55; 1390 ¶13.  The 
Trustees below stated that it was “crystal clear that no Plan participant other than Criscito 
had an interest in the Smith Barney Account after December 31, 1999.”  Because there is 
no evidence that others possessed an interest in the Smith Barney Account, it cannot be 
used to reduce Criscito’s liability. 
Finally, Criscito argues it was inappropriate for the District Court to use the VFCP 
calculator because it was “designed to provide a ‘safe harbor’ whereby a fiduciary may 
voluntarily remedy a breach of fiduciary duty, and thereby avoid civil or criminal 
liability.”  He points to the regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor 
regarding the purpose of the program, and the amount to be restored for participant-
directed accounts.  Adoption of Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 
15066 (March 28, 2002) (“The VFC Program is structured to make the plan whole 
without the need for investigation and suit and the costs attendant thereto in exchange for 
relief from penalties under section 502(l).”); Id. at 15074 (“For a participant-directed 
defined contribution plan, the Lost Earnings to be restored to the plan is the amount that 
each participant would have earned on the Principal Amount from the Loss Date to the 
Recovery Date.”). 
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We believe that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in using the VFCP 
calculator in this case.  No one can determine the rate of return the individual participants 
would have earned had Criscito distributed to each individual his or her full share of the 
Morgan Stanley Account, because no one knows with certainty what actions the 
individuals would have taken had they received their fair share of the accounts.  But yet 
the district courts are tasked with coming up with an interest rate to award prejudgment 
interest.  Because of this inherent difficulty, the district courts have “broad discretion” in 
resolving the problem.  See Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 205–06.   
The use of the VFCP calculator was an appropriate way for the District Court to 
resolve the problem of calculating damages.  Other district courts faced with this problem 
have also used this calculator.  See Hawaii Carpenters Trust Funds vs. TNT Plastering & 
Stucco, Inc., Civ. No. 10-00352, 2011 WL 613695, at *7 (D. Haw. Feb. 11, 2011) (stating 
that plaintiffs would be entitled to full amount under VFCP calculator if they had 
requested it); Trs. of the Plumbers Local Union No. 1 v. Philip Gen. Constr., No. 05-CV-
1665, 2007 WL 3124612, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007) (stating that using VFCP 
calculator “appears to be reasonable” and using it to determine the plaintiffs lost 
earnings).  We need not address Criscito’s proposed alternative calculations because the 
question before us is not whether the District Court calculated the damage in the best way 
possible; it is whether using the VFCP calculator was an abuse of discretion.  We hold 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining the different 
components of its compensatory damages award given the facts of this case. 
III. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly (1) denied Criscito’s motion 
to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, (2) granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment, and (3) calculated the damages.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s opinion in all respects. 
